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ABSTRACT

The Northern District of Illinois took a proactive step in addressing procedural issues
that commonly arise in patent litigation by enacting the Court's Local Patent Rules.
These Rules provide a uniform structure to pretrial procedures in patent cases involving
claims of infringement, non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of utility
patents. The Rules will enable greater predictability and planning for the Court,
counsel, and clients by requiring parties to indentify and focus upon outcomedeterminative or otherwise significant disputes. This article offers insight on the
Rules from two members of the committee of district court judges and experienced
lawyers that initially drafted them. The authors outline an estimated schedule for a
patent case to be trial-ready in just under two years by providing a step-by-step guide
in applying the Rules.
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ADOPTS LOCAL PATENT RULES
JUDGE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY* AND EDWARD

D. MANzo**

On September 24, 2009, the judges of United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois approved a set of local patent rules that took effect on
October 1, 2009.1 This article offers some comment on those Rules by two members
of the committee that initially drafted them. The Rules include their own comments.
Nothing stated in this article has any official imprimatur.

I. BACKGROUND TO THE LOCAL PATENT RULES

The Northern District of Illinois is one of the most active jurisdictions in the
United States for patent litigation.2 On average, however, patent cases in the
Northern District in recent years have remained pending longer than in nearly every
other district, including districts with far more patent cases per judge.
Prior to 2008, a number of federal district courts-some with greater and some
with lesser numbers of patent infringement cases-had adopted local patent rules. 3

* Matthew F. Kennelly is a United States District Judge in the Northern District of Illinois. He
was appointed and entered into active service in 1999. His law degree is from Harvard Law School
(1981, magna cum laude), and his undergraduate degree is from the University of Notre Dame
(1978, summa cum laude). Since 2003, he has been a member of the Seventh Circuit Civil Jury
Instruction Committee and chaired a subcommittee that drafted the pattern instructions for patent
infringement cases adopted in 2008. Judge Kennelly chaired the committee that drafted the
Northern District's Local Patent Rules.
** Edward D. Manzo is a co-founder of Cook Alex Ltd., an intellectual property law firm in
Chicago. He is President-Elect of IPLAC, an adjunct professor of law (teaching patent law), and
editor-in-chief of Claim Construction in the Federal Circuit(Thomson West 2006-date) and Patent
Claim Interpretation-Global
Edition (Thomson West 2008-date). He served on the committee that
drafted the Local Patent Rules of the Northern District of Illinois. He also served on the
subcommittee that drafted the pattern instructions for patent infringement cases adopted in 2008
for use throughout the Seventh Circuit.
1 See Press Release, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., N. Dist. of Ill. Local Patent Rules
Effective October 1, 2009 (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Local Patent Rules Effective
October 1, 2009] (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/-assets/news/Local%20Patent%20Rules.pdf.
Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83 provides for the adoption of local rules by District Courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).
2 See David L. Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect?An EmpiricalStudy of Claim Construction
ReversalRates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 246 tbl.2 (2008). The Northern District of
Illinois, with federal courts in both Chicago and Rockford, Illinois, is allocated 22 active judges
making it the third most populous bench in terms of active judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2008).
The Southern District of New York is allocated 28 judges, the Central District of California is
allocated 27 judges, and both the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania are allocated 22 active judges. Id. As of October 1, 2009, the Northern District of
Illinois had 33 district judges (including senior judges) along with 11 magistrate judges. Northern
District of Illinois Judges, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
3 See, e.g., E.D. TEX. P.R.; N.D. GA. PATENT L.R.; see also LEXISNEXIS COURTLINK NATURE OF
SUIT STRATEGIC PROFILE (Dec. 31, 2002-Dec. 31, 2007) (on file with The John Marshall Review of
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The Northern District had no such rules, but a handful of judges had posted their
own procedures concerning claim construction proceedings and other procedures for
handling some parts of patent cases. 4 As a result, there was wide variation in the
procedures that individual judges in the Northern District used to manage such cases
and in the relative length of time a patent case would remain pending prior to
disposition.
Many members of the local bar perceived the absence of a uniform set of rules
for patent litigation as a deficiency leading to serious uncertainty for litigants and
lawyers about how patent litigation would progress when conducted in the Northern
District of Illinois. 5 The procedural progression of a case was unpredictable, and
time to trial was both unpredictable and distant.6 Clients wanted a greater degree of
7
certainty so that they could better manage litigation budgets.
One bar association closely concerned with patent litigation in the Northern
District, the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago ("IPLAC"), undertook a
project to encourage the adoption of local patent rules. IPLAC is the oldest
intellectual property bar association in the United States, and one of the largesthaving over 1,000 members.8 In the spring of 2008, IPLAC's Litigation Committee
approached Chief Judge James F. Holderman to propose that the Court consider
adoption of a set of local patent rules. Chief Judge Holderman was receptive to
studying the matter. He appointed a working group consisting of himself and Judges
James B. Zagel (the chair of the Court's Rules Committee), Matthew F. Kennelly, and
Amy E. St. Eve to work with IPLAC's Litigation Committee.
IPLAC's Litigation Committee formed a local patent rules subcommittee and, at
the request of the Court's working group, polled IPLAC's non-judicial members on
whether they favored some form of local patent rules. 9 Nearly ninety percent of those
who responded favored some form of local patent rules. IPLAC received comments
that a uniform set of local rules for patent litigation would provide consistency,
Intellectual Property Law) (ranking the Eastern District of Texas third, the Northern District of
Illinois fourth, and the Northern District of Georgia thirteenth among the top twenty-four most
active judicial districts by the number of patent lawsuits filed).
4 See, e.g., JUDGE VIRGINIA KENDALL, JUDGE KENDAL'S STANDING ORDER FOR PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDINGS, available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/KENDALL/VK
_PatentClaim.pdf, JUDGE AMY ST. EVE, JUDGE ST. EVE'S STANDING ORDER FOR PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDINGS, available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/STEVE/pdf/ajs
_claimconstruction.pdf.
5 See Jerry Crimmins, New Rules Could Boost Patent Filings, 155 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 214,
Nov. 2, 2009, at 1 ("The biggest advantage... [is the local patent rules] give[] the attorneys and
clients a much more solid foundation on which to base budgets and scheduling." (quoting Allan J.
Sternstein of Dykema, Gossett PLLC)).
6 See id. at 1-2 ("The time to trial in the Northern District of Illinois for a patent cases was
really, really, really long, just way out of kilter with other cases in the Northern District of
Illinois .... " (quoting Bradford P. Lyerla of Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP)).
7 See id.; see also Mark L. Levine & Alan E. Littmann, ManagingPatentLitigation: Successful
Results at Reasonable Cost, in PAT. LITIG. 2009, at 293, 295 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 19028, 2009), available at WL, 982 PLI/Pat 293
(stating that reducing uncertainty of patent litigation allows parties to "value their case and
determine whether remaining litigation costs exceed the probable return.").
8 Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago, History of the Intellectual Property Law
Association of Chicago, http://www.iplac.org/History/history.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
9 Over 30 federal judges are honorary members of IPLAC.
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uniformity, and predictability in patent cases and thereby promote fairness,
improved case management, and improved client relations. Clients would be able to
plan litigation schedules and budgets, an increasingly important concern given the
significant expense associated with patent infringement litigation. To be sure, there
were contrary comments along the lines that the Court already had too many rules
and that more rules and layers of complexity were not needed. Based on the results
of the survey, IPLAC determined as a bar association to proceed with the local patent
rules project and to assign the subcommittee's members to work with the Court on
writing those rules.
Experienced lawyers from Chicago's patent litigation community participated on
the working group. Allan J. Sternstein 10 chaired IPLAC's subcommittee, which also
included Bradford P. Lyerla," Dean A. Monco, 12 Michael P. Padden, 13 Marshall
Seeder, 14 Paul K. Vickrey, 15 and Edward D. Manzo. 16 Some of these lawyers typically
represented defendants, at least one generally worked as a plaintiffs contingent fee
lawyer, and others were patent litigators representing both plaintiffs and defendants
17
of varying sizes.
The working group of lawyers and judges began by collecting and reviewing the
local patent rules adopted by other district courts. These included local rules for the
Northern and Southern Districts of California, the Northern District of Georgia, the
District of Minnesota, the Eastern District of North Carolina, the Western District of
Pennsylvania, and the Eastern and Southern District of Texas. 18 The Committee
10Allan J. Sternstein is Director of the Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property
Litigation Department at Dykema Gossett PLLC and is in the firm's Chicago office. Dykema
Professional - Allan Sternstein, http://www.dykema.comlbio/display.asp?emplD=512 (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009). Allan is also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Illinois, teaching Patent
Litigation. Id
11Bradford P. Lyerla is with Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP in Chicago. Marshall, Gerstein
& Borun LLP: Professionals, http://www.marshallip.com/professionals-51.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2009). Brad served on the IPLAC Board at the time the local patent rules were being drafted and
currently chairs the IPLAC Antitrust Committee. Id.
12 Dean A. Monco is with Wood, Phillips, Katz, Clark & Mortimer in Chicago. Dean A. Monco
People Wood Phillips, http://www.woodphillips.com/people/080-Dean A. Monco.php (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009). Dean chaired the IPLAC Litigation Committee during the time the local patent
rules were drafted.
13 Michael P. Padden is with Howrey LLP in the Chicago office. Howrey - People - Michael P.
Padden, http://www.howrey.com/paddenm/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
14 Marshall Seeder is with Reed Smith LLP in its Chicago office. Seeder, Marshall, http://
www.reedsmith.com/our-people.cfm?cit-id=12361&widCalll=customWidgets.content-view-1
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2009).
15 Paul K. Vickrey is with Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Ltd. in Chicago. Niro, Scavone, Haller
& Niro, http://www.niroscavone.com/document.php?Id=74 (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
16 Edward D. Manzo is with Cook Alex Ltd. in Chicago and is IPLAC's President Elect. Cook
Alex Profiles Edward D. Manzo, http://www.cookalex.com/Profiles/Bios/manzoEdward.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009); see supra note **.
17 Judge Kennelly chaired the subcommittee of the Seventh Circuit Jury Instruction
Committee that worked for over two years preparing pattern jury instructions, which the court
adopted in 2008 for use throughout the Seventh Circuit. See COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT 2, available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/PatternJury-Instr/7th civ-instruc_2009.pdf.
Edward D. Manzo also served on that committee. Id.
18 See N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R.,
available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/localrul
.nsffec20e529a5572f0882569b6006607e0/5e313c0b7e4cd680882573e20062dbcf/$FILE/Pat3-08.pd,
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also considered the procedures posted by Judges Amy E. St. Eve and Virginia
Kendall of the Northern District of Illinois and by Judge Shaw of the Eastern District
of Missouri, along with proposed rules for the Western District of Washington. 19
During the course of the work of the working group, the District of New Jersey also
adopted local patent rules. 20 The Committee noted the trends in these rules and
sought to draft a set of rules that would eliminate the need to litigate procedural
matters that commonly recur in patent infringement cases and reduce the time
patent cases remain pending prior to disposition in a way that would be acceptable to
the judges within the Northern District.
The working group worked for approximately six months to produce a set of
rules, which the Court posted for public comment in March 2009.21 A number of
lawyers and bar associations submitted comments, which the working group and the
judges of the Court considered in full. The working group and the Court's Rules
Committee made several adjustments to the draft set of rules before presenting them
for adoption by the full Court. As a result of the efforts of the lawyers and judges in
the working group, the full Court readily embraced the proposed rules.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE RULES
The Rules are designated as Local Patent Rules, abbreviated "LPR." They apply
to all cases filed in or transferred to the District after October 1, 2009 involving a
claim of infringement, non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of a utility
patent. 22 The Rules deal with the most common types of patent cases; they do not try
to address every possible type of patent case. Among other things, the Rules do not
expressly cover cases involving design patents, plant patents, or cases arising under

S.D. CAL. PATENT L.R., available at http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/uploads/Rules/Local%20Rules/
LocalRules.pdf, N.D. GA. PATENT L.R., available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/NDGARules
Patent.pdf, D. MINN. PATENT LR, available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/local-rules/pdfdoc
/localrules.pd LOCAL PATENT RULES, EDNC, available at http://www.nced.uscourts.gov/PDF
_FilesLR06-2009.pdf, W.D. PA. LPR, available at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/
LocalPatentRules.pdf; E.D. TEX. P.R., available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules
/Documents/Appendix%20M.pdC S.D. TEX. P.R., available at http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/district/
rulesproc/patent/rules.pdf.
19 See W.D. WASH. PROPOSED LOCAL PATENT RULES, availableat http://www.wawd.uscourts.
gov/documents/ProposedLocalRules/Patent%20(Redline).pd, JUDGE VIRGINIA KENDALL, JUDGE
KENDALL'S STANDING ORDER FOR PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDINGS, available at
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/KENDALL/VKPatentClaim.pd, JUDGE AMY ST. EVE, JUDGE
ST. EVE'S STANDING ORDER FOR PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDINGS, available at http://
www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE/STEVE/pdf/ajs-claimconstruction.pd,
Charles A. Shaw - United
States District Judge, Judge Charles A. Shaw Patent Rules, http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/ judges
/cas.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
20 D. N.J. L. Civ. R. 9.3 (Local Patent Rules), available at http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/rules
/completeRules- 1- 1-09.pdf.
21 See Press Release, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., N. Dist. Ill. Judges Propose Local
Patent Rules (Mar. 23, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law),

available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/documents/Rules/Patent%20Rls%2OPress
.pdf.
22 N.D.

ILL. LPR 1.1; Press Release, Local Patent Rules Effective October 1, 2009, supra note 1.
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paragraph 4 of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 23 These should be addressed by the trial
judge on a case-by-case basis.
The working group strove to develop a procedural schedule that would enable a
patent infringement or declaratory judgment case to be ready for trial 102 weeks
just under two years) after service of summons. This is significantly less than the
nearly four years that patent cases in the District currently require on average. The
Rules do not seek to have the fastest time to trial in the country nor to create a
"rocket docket." The Court has, however, made it clear that it wants to encourage
the prompt disposition of patent litigation in the District. 24 The Court is highly
mindful of the admonitions of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
calls for the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
25
proceeding."
The Rules adopt a procedural framework that differs from many of the local
patent rules that exist in other districts. 26 This includes the following steps:
early "preliminary" disclosures of key infringement, non-infringement, and
27
invalidity contentions by each side, for the purpose of focusing discovery;
a period of fact discovery, followed by the making of final infringement, non2
infringement, and invalidity disclosures; 8
claim construction, followed by a brief period of additional fact discovery to
address additional issues prompted by the Court's claim construction
ruling; 29 and
expert discovery beginning after claim construction. 30
Because patent litigation almost always involves confidential or secret
information, a standard protective order is deemed to be automatically in effect in
cases that fall within the scope of the Rules. 31 The automatic entry of a protective
order facilitates the early preliminary disclosures that are one of the key features of
the Rules. The Rules also include a standardized, fill-in-the-blanks report to be
submitted to the Court after the parties conduct their initial planning meeting
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(0.32
The Local Patent Rules, together with the standardized protective order and the
33
initial planning meeting report, are available on the Court's website.
An estimated timetable for patent litigation under the Rules appears as an
Appendix to this article.
23 At least one other federal district court mentions Hatch-Waxman litigation in its local patent
rules. See, e.g., D. N.J. L. PAT. R. 3.6 (providing a specific provision that applies to all patent cases
"arising under 21 U.S.C. § 355 (commonly referred to as 'the Hatch-Waxman Act')").
24
See N.D. ILL. LPR pmbl.
25

FED.R. Civ. P. 1.
A:

26 See APPENDIX

CHART COMPARING THE LocAL PATENT RULES, http://www.jenner.com/

files/tbl_sl8News/RelatedDocumentsl47/5370/LocalPatentRulesChart.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
27 See N.D. ILL. LPR 2 cmt.; N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1-2.6 ("Patent Initial Disclosures").
28 See N.D. ILL. LPR 3.1-3.6 ("Final Contentions").
29 See N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1-4.3 ("Claim Construction Proceedings").
30See N.D. ILL. LPR 5.1-5.3 ("Expert Witnesses").
31N.D. ILL. LPR 1.4; N.D. ILL. LPR app. B.
32N.D. ILL. LPR 1.2; N.D. ILL. LPR app. A.
33See United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Local Rules, http://
www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.aspx?rtab=patentrules (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
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III. SPECIFIC RULES PROVISIONS: PRE-CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

In this section of the article, we have estimated how long each step will take
after service of summons. The Rules do not use that concept; rather all time periods
are based on certain prior events, beginning with the date on which the defendant
responds to the complaint by answer or motion. 34 In our time estimate, we have
assumed that a defendant will receive a one-month extension of time to respond to
the complaint. The Rules, however, do not provide for an automatic extension, and
we do not intend by this assumption to suggest that a one-month extension should be
considered the norm. Where the section titles in this article refer to the number of
weeks that have passed from the service of summons, they assume that the litigants
will use the full time periods allocated to them under the Rules and that there will be
a one-month extension of time to respond to the complaint.

A. The Complaint andAnswer
The Rules contain no specific provisions regarding the complaint in a patent
infringement action. As previously noted, LPR 1.1 makes the Local Patent Rules
applicable to cases involving a claim of infringement, non-infringement, invalidity, or
unenforceability of a utility patent. 35 It matters not whether such a claim is first
asserted in the complaint or in an answer, reply, cross-claim, or counterclaim.
The Rules do not specify the time for responding to the complaint but do use the
date of response as the basis for calculating the due date of the Initial Disclosures,
discussed below.

B. InitialScheduling Conference and Joint Scheduling Order (LPR 1.2)
The Rules provide a form scheduling order as Appendix A to the Rules. 36 This is
due one week after the Rule 26(f) conference or such other time as the Court may
37
set.

C. Week 9: InitialDisclosures (LPR 2. 1)
The Rules include a Comment to Part 2 of the LPR, stating as follows:
LPR 2.2 - 2.5 supplements the initial disclosures required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1). As stated in the comment to LPR 1.6, the
purpose of these provisions is to require the parties to identify the likely
issues in the case, to enable them to focus and narrow their discovery
requests. To accomplish this purpose, the parties' disclosures must be
34

See N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1.

35 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.2.

36N.D. ILL. LPR app. A.
37 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.2.
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meaningful - as opposed to boilerplate - and non-evasive. These provisions
38
should be construed accordingly when applied to particular cases.
LPR 2.1 calls for initial disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1) within fourteen days after the answer or other response to the complaint. 39
The tentative schedule puts this nine weeks after the complaint is filed. 40 Both the
plaintiff and any defendant that responds to the complaint must make initial
disclosures. 41 LPR 2.1 does not contemplate that the deadline for initial disclosures
be delayed if there are multiple defendants who respond to the complaint at different
times. Rather, LPR 2.1 makes the plaintiffs and each defendant's reciprocal
disclosures due fourteen days after the particular defendant has responded to the
complaint. 42 A party may, of course, move the Court to coordinate the deadlines in a
multiple-defendant case 43 but should get such a motion on file promptly, before the
disclosures are due, as the pendency of such a motion does not serve to stay or defer
44
any of the Rules' disclosure requirements.
The Rules do not contemplate a stay of the initial disclosures if the defendant
does not answer the complaint but instead moves to dismiss, to transfer, or for some
other form of relief. In the event that a defendant files a counterclaim for
infringement of a different patent, LPR 2.1 extends the initial disclosures to fourteen
45
days after the plaintiff replies to the counterclaim.
The working group and the Court followed the lead of other local patent rules
and adopted a rule that requires a party asserting patent infringement (sometimes
also called the "patent proponent" or the "patent asserter" in this article) to produce
or make available, as part of the initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(1), several categories of documents to the extent that they are within
that party's possession, custody, or control. 46
These are enumerated in LPR
2.1(a)(1)-(4). 47 The first category concerns disclosures and sales or offers for sale
prior to the patent application filing date. 48 This requires the candid disclosure of
various documents that might constitute prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 49 The Rule
makes clear that "Production of a document pursuant to this Rule is not an
admission that the document evidences or is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102."50
Another category of documents the party asserting infringement must produce
includes pre-application filing documents that concern conception, reduction to
practice, design and development. 5 1 The remaining categories of documents that a
38 N.D.

ILL. LPR 2 cmt.

39N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1.
40 See infra app.
41N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1.
42 Id.

43See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1.
44

See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.4.

45N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1.

46N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(a)(1)-(4).
47
d.
48 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(a)(1).
49Id.

50 Id.
51N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(a)(2). The Committee considered whether to require the patent asserter
also to identify its current products or processes practicing the invention but ultimately decided
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party asserting infringement must produce includes communications with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and documents concerning ownership of the
52
patent rights.
LPR 2.1 also imposes upon the alleged infringer or party challenging a patent
requirements for production of documents as part of the initial Rule 26(a)(1)
disclosures. 5 3 These include:
(1)
documents sufficient to show the operation and construction of
all aspects or elements of each accused apparatus, product, device,
component, process, method or other instrumentality identified with
specificity in the pleading of the party asserting patent infringement; and
(2)
a copy of each item of prior art of which the party is aware that
allegedly anticipates each asserted patent and its related claims or renders
them obvious or, if a copy is unavailable, a description sufficient to identify
54
the prior art and its relevant details.
During the drafting process, the working group discussed the burden that the
first of these requirements might impose on an accused infringer. At one point, the
proposal was directed only to the most current version of the accused product or
process, so as not to burden the defendant with having to unearth out-of-date
documents. However, because the current version of a product might not be accused
of infringing, the Rule as adopted focuses on each accused apparatus, etc., that is
identified with particularity in the opposing party's pleading. 55 Hence, a patent
owner facing a "black box" product, process, etc., is entitled to receive information
56
sufficient to show the operation and construction of this accused instrumentality.
A defendant that regards these initial production requirements to be overly
burdensome is, of course, free to seek relief from the Court. 57 That said, the judges of
the Court effectively determined, in adopting the Rules, that the initial production
requirements on each side were fairly imposed and would not be unduly burdensome
in the overwhelming majority of cases. The Rules seek to take into account the goal
of prompt determination of disputes, and to that end, the initial disclosures are
aimed at getting into each side's hands key documents they will need to conduct a
preliminary assessment of the case and focus later discovery requests.
The party asserting infringement is also entitled to receive via the initial
disclosures a copy of all prior art then known to the opposing party that allegedly
anticipates any claim of the patent or renders it obvious.58 As worded, the Rule does

against this. Though it may bear on such issues as commercial success of the invention (non-

obviousness) and whether the patent asserter would be entitled to an injunction if infringement is
determined, the burden of requiring the plaintiff to make this disclosure at this time was not
believed to be warranted.
52 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(a)(3)-(4).
53 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(b).
54 Id.

55 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(b)(1).
56 See id.
57 See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1 ("The Court may modify the obligations and deadlines of the LPR
based on the circumstances of any particular case.").
58 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.1(b)(2).
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not contain any exceptions or limitations for cases involving a patent with numerous
claims in which fewer than all of the claims may be at issue. A defendant that
considers the disclosure requirement unduly burdensome may, of course, apply to the
Court to limit the prior art disclosures to less than all of the claims.5 9 Any such
motion should be made well in advance of the disclosure requirement, because the
pendency of a motion does not automatically stay any disclosure requirement under
the Rules.
Confidentiality. It is fair to anticipate that parties to patent litigation will
assert that some of the initial disclosures involve information that the producing
party considers to be confidential or proprietary. Because legitimate confidentiality
requirements exist in virtually every patent case, the Rules include a "default"
protective order that is automatically deemed to be in place as of the date of each
party's initial disclosures.6 0 The purpose of automatic entry of the protective order is
to avoid the delays in making initial disclosures that likely would occur if the
disclosures had to await the party's negotiation and the Court's entry of a casespecific protective order.
Appendix B to the LPR sets forth the terms of the
automatic protective order.6 1 "Any party may move the Court to modify the
Appendix B protective order for good cause."6 2 Consistent with the Rules' provision
for prompt initial disclosures, however, the pendency of a motion to modify the
default protective order is not a basis to delay the making of any of the early
disclosures required by the Rules.
The automatic protective order has two levels of confidentiality--"confidential"
information and "highly confidential" information.6 3 The latter category is reserved
for current or future business or technical trade secrets and plans that are more
sensitive or strategic than ordinary "confidential" information, the disclosure of
which is likely to harm significantly the producing party's competitive position or
contravene an obligation of confidentiality.6 4 If a party objects to an opposing party's
designation of material as highly confidential, the producing party has the burden to
move the Court within fourteen days after a meet and confer session and also has the
65
burden to justify the confidentiality level that it seeks.

59See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1.
60
See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.4.
61N.D. ILL. LPR app. B.

62N.D. ILL. LPR 1.4. The Preamble to the Local Patent Rules explains as follows:
Finally, the Rules provide for a standardized protective order that is deemed
to be in effect upon the initiation of the lawsuit. This is done for two reasons.
First, confidentiality issues abound in patent litigation. Second, early entry of a
protective order is critical to enable the early initial disclosures of patent-related
contentions that the Rules require. Absent a "default" protective order, the
making of initial disclosures, and thus the entire schedule, would be delayed
while the parties negotiated a protective order. The parties may, either at the
outset of the case or later, seek a revised protective order that is more tailored to
their case. Because, however, the Rules provide for automatic entry of the default
protective order, the desire to negotiate a more tailored version is not a basis to
delay the disclosure and discovery schedule that the Rules contemplate.
N.D. ILL. LPR pmbl.
63N.D. ILL. LPR app. B(2)(b)-(c).
64 N.D. ILL. LPR app. B(2)(c).
65N.D. ILL. LPR app. B(3)(.
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The recipient of information designated as confidential may disclose it only to
outside counsel of record, inside counsel, officers and employees directly involved in
the case and whose access to the information is reasonably required to supervise,
manage, or participate in the case, as well as experts and consultants (subject to
certain requirements, including the signing of a confidentiality undertaking by the
proposed recipient).66 "Highly confidential" information may be provided to the same
67
group, except for in-house counsel and the party's officers and employees.
The fact that a document is designated as confidential or highly confidential
under the protective order does not, by itself, authorize the filing of any documents
under seal.68 Consistent with standard practice in the Northern District, a party
must obtain leave of court before filing any document or portion of a document under
69
seal.

D. Week 11: InitialInfringement Contentions (LPR2.2)
Complaints and counterclaims in patent infringement cases typically take a
bare-bones approach, alleging infringement, non-infringement, validity, or invalidity
in a relatively conclusory fashion.70 This makes it difficult for a party to get a handle
on its opponent's contentions and their bases without conducting discovery. Given
the jockeying for position that commonly takes place in the early stages of the
discovery process, the result is twofold: there may be considerable delay before the
parties are able to identify what is truly in dispute, and each party may incur undue
expense simply to get to the core of its opponent's contentions.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, an attorney who signs a pleading,
including a pleading alleging patent infringement, non-infringement, validity, or
invalidity, certifies (among other things) that based upon reasonable inquiry, the
pleading's factual contentions have or are likely to have evidentiary support and its
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a reasonable extension of existing
law. 71 The overwhelming majority of lawyers take their Rule 11 obligations quite

ILL. LPR app. B(4)(b).
N.D. ILL. LPR app. B(4)(c).
68 N.D. ILL. LPR app. B(7)(a).
66 N.D.
67

69Id
70 See

FED. R. CiV. P. 84 app. Form 18 (entitled "Complaint for Patent Infringement").

71 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading,

written motion, or other paper - whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it - an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
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seriously. Accordingly, it is reasonable to believe that attorneys who file complaints,
answers, and counterclaims in patent infringement cases have a reasonable basis for
their contentions.
The Northern District's Local Patent Rules "initial contention" disclosure
requirements obligate each party to disclose the basis for its allegations regarding
the basic issues in most patent infringement cases.72 The working group believed,
and the Court agreed, that these disclosures will help to focus the litigation at an
early stage and contribute to its prompt disposition.
Under LPR 2.2, approximately eleven weeks after service of summons
(specifically, fourteen days after the initial disclosures under LPR 2.1), a party
claiming patent infringement is required to serve its "Initial Infringement
Contentions." 73 This requires the party to, among other things, identify the patent
claims it contends are infringed and each accused instrumentality (product, process,
etc.) and to provide a statement of whether each element is believed to be found
literally or via the doctrine of equivalents.7 4 If the latter, the party claiming
infringement must explain the function, way, and result that is equivalent and why
the differences are insubstantial. 75 Counsel of record must certify the initial
76
contentions.
The working group and the Court recognized that developments during the
litigation may lead a party to alter its contentions regarding infringement or validity.
Because the initial contentions are made at such an early stage of the litigation, the
Local Patent Rules expressly provide that they are inadmissible as evidence on the
merits. 77 The Rules contain a comment explaining that the purpose of initial
disclosures is to promote and focus discovery:
The purpose of the initial disclosures pursuant to LPR 2.2 - 2.5 is to
identify the likely issues in the case, to enable the parties to focus and
narrow their discovery requests. Permitting use of the initial disclosures as
evidence on the merits would defeat this purpose. A party may make
78
reference to the initial disclosures for any other appropriate purpose.
Additionally, a Preamble to the Local Patent Rules explains the Court's
approach to initial contentions:
The Rules require, along with a party's disclosures under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), meaningful disclosure of each party's
contentions and support for allegations in the pleadings. Complaints and
counterclaims in most patent cases are worded in a bare-bones fashion,
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
Id.
72

N.D. ILL. LPR 2.2.

73Id., see infra app.
74N.D. ILL. LPR 2.2.
75N.D. ILL. LPR 2.2(d).
76 N.D.

ILL. LPR 1.5.

77N.D. ILL. LPR 1.6.
78 N.D.ILL. LPR 1.6 cmt.
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necessitating discovery to flesh out the basis for each party's contentions.
The Rules require the parties to provide the particulars behind allegations
of infringement, non-infringement, and invalidity at an early date. Because
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires a party to have factual and
legal support for allegations in its pleadings, early disclosure of the basis for
each side's allegations will impose no unfair hardship and will benefit all
parties by enabling a focus on the contested issues at an early stage of the
case. The Rules' supplementation of the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1) and
other Federal Rules is also appropriate due to the various ways in which
patent litigation differs from most other civil litigation, including its factual
complexity; the routine assertion of counterclaims; the need for the Court to
construe, and thus for the parties to identify, disputed language in patent
claims; and the variety of ways in which a patent may be infringed or
invalid.
The initial disclosures required by the Rules are not intended to
confine a party to the contentions it makes at the outset of the case. It is
not unusual for a party in a patent case to learn additional grounds for
claims of infringement, non-infringement, and invalidity as the case
progresses. After a reasonable period for fact discovery, however, each
party must provide a final statement of its contentions on relevant issues,
which the party may thereafter amend only "upon a showing of good cause
and absence of unfair prejudice, made in timely fashion following discovery
of the basis for the amendment." LPR 3.4.79

E. Week 13: InitialNon -Infringement,Unenforceabiity,and Invalidity Contentions
(LPR2.3)
Two weeks after the party claiming infringement serves its initial contentions,
LPR 2.3 requires the accused infringer to serve initial contentions explaining the
basis for any claims of non-infringement, unenforceability, and invalidity.80 The Rule
requires the party to identify prior art upon which the party will rely for a claim of
invalidity, including a statement of whether the party contends the prior art
8
anticipates the patent claim or renders is obvious, and how. '
If the party accused of infringement asserts defenses of indefiniteness, lack of
enablement, or insufficient written description, LPR 2.3 requires a detailed
statement of the basis for the defense.8 2 The same is true if a party asserts a defense
of unenforceability.8 3 Like the Initial Infringement Contentions, these "Initial NonInfringement, Unenforceability and Invalidity Contentions" must be certified by
counsel of record.8 4 Along with this response, the alleged infringer must make a
supplemental production of additional documentation showing the operation of

79 N.D. ILL. LPR pmbl.
80 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.3.

81N.D. ILL. LPR 2.3(b)(1)-(3).
82 N.D.

ILL. LPR 2.3(b)(4).
ILL. LPR 2.3(c).
84 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.5.
83 N.D.
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aspects or elements of the accused instrumentality identified in the LPR 2.2 chart
and the additional prior art identified pursuant to LPR 2.3.85
The party accused of infringement must serve its initial contentions just two
weeks after service of the opposing party's infringement contentions.8 6
This,
however, is approximately thirteen weeks after service of summons and after the
party has received considerable information regarding the details of the claim of
infringement.8 7 The defendant thus has over three months to develop its initial
contentions which, like the parallel initial infringement contentions, cannot be used
against the defendant as evidence on the merits.88 The working group and the Court
believed that under the circumstances, imposition of this preliminary disclosure
requirement was reasonable and not unfairly burdensome. The timing of these
disclosure obligations, however, requires the parties to get a handle on the case
promptly and without undue delay.
It is not unusual for settlement discussions to begin soon after a patent
infringement suit is filed, or even before suit is filed. Indeed, one purpose of the
initial disclosure requirements is to require the parties to focus promptly on the
contested issues, and the result may be to prompt early discussion regarding
settlement. If the parties believe in good faith that settlement negotiations are
serious and reasonably likely to result in an agreed disposition of the case, they may,
of course, ask the judge presiding over the case to put the LPR schedule in
abeyance.8 9 It will be up to the judge to decide, in the context of the particular case,
whether following the Rules' presumptive schedule and "keeping the heat on" or,
instead, allowing a hiatus is more likely to produce the prompt and just resolution of
the litigation. 90

F. Week 15: InitialResponse to Invalidity Contentions (LPR2.5)
Two weeks later (approximately fifteen weeks after summons is served), the
party claiming infringement is required by LPR 2.5 to serve a point-by-point
response concerning the opposing party's initial invalidity and unenforceability
contentions. 91 Like the earlier initial contention statements, this disclosure must be
92
certified by counsel of record.

85 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.4.
86 N.D.

ILL. LPR 2.3.

87 See infra app.
88 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.6; see infra app.
89 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1; see N.D. ILL.

LR 16.1(a); N.D. ILL. STANDING ORD. ESTABLISHING
PRETRIAL P. 5 ("Counsel and the parties are directed to undertake a good faith effort to settle that
includes a thorough exploration of the prospects of settlement ..
").
90 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1; see N.D. ILL. LR 16.1(a); N.D. ILL. STANDING ORD. ESTABLISHING
PRETRIAL P. 1 ("Parties should also be aware that there may be variances in the forms and
procedures used by each of the judges in implementing these [pretrial] procedures.").
91 N.D. ILL. LPR 2.5; see infra app.
92N.D. ILL. LPR 1.5 ("All disclosures made pursuant to LPR 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, and 3.2 must
be dated and signed by counsel of record ... ").
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G

Weeks 9-42: FactDiscovery (LPR1.3)

The Rules impose a starting and ending point for fact discovery. Under LPR 1.3,
fact discovery may not begin until the date for initial disclosures, and it comes to a
hiatus twenty-eight days after the date for exchange of claim terms and phrases
under LPR 4.1. 93 Because that exchange is scheduled to take place approximately
thirty-eight weeks after summons is served, the initial period of fact discovery is to
4
be completed approximately forty-two weeks after serviceY
The Rules also place some limitations on the content of discovery. Because the
Rules impose a particularized structure and sequence for disclosures regarding
various key issues, they permit a party to object to certain discovery requests seeking
position statements on those issues on the ground of prematurity.9 5 The issues are:
(a)
requests for a party's claim construction position;
(b)
requests to the patent claimant for a comparison of the asserted
claims and the accused apparatus, device, process, method, act, or other
instrumentality;
(c)
requests to an accused infringer for a comparison of the asserted
claims and the prior art;
(d)
requests to an accused infringer for its non-infringement
contentions; and
(e)
requests to the patent claimant for its contentions regarding the
96
presence of claim elements in the prior art.
There are two reasons for the hiatus in fact discovery prior to claim construction
and its brief resumption after claim construction. First, the working group and the
Court considered it reasonable to require fact discovery to be largely completed prior
to claim construction in order to enable the parties to identify the key claim terms
that are likely to be dispositive. Second, because the Court may take significant time
to rule on claim construction, there is no need to burden the parties with the expense
of ongoing fact discovery during that indefinite period. For these reasons, fact
discovery stops twenty-eight days after the parties exchange the claim terms that
97
they contend need to be construed.
In addition, a court's claim interpretation ruling may have a significant impact
on the issues to be litigated. The working group and the Court believed that for this
reason, the parties should have an opportunity to supplement fact discovery following
the claim construction ruling. Accordingly, LPR 1.3 provides that fact discovery may
resume upon entry of the claim construction ruling, and it "shall end" forty-two days
98
(six weeks) after that ruling.

N.D. ILL. LPR 1.3.
See infra app.
95 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.7.
96 See id.
97 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.3.
98 Jd
93
94
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Week 32: Cross FihngofFinalInfringement, Unenforceability,and Invalidity
Contentions (LPR3.1)

Part 3 of the Rules addresses the parties' final contentions.
The Rules
contemplate simultaneous service of final contentions by the proponents (those
bearing the burden of proof or making a claim) on the issue of infringement and on
the issues of invalidity and unenforceability. 99 These contentions are due prior to
claim construction by the Court and must be certified by counsel of record, and they
are required approximately thirty-two weeks after service of summons. 10 0 Unlike the
initial contentions, the final contentions may be used as evidence against a party.101

I

Week 36: CrossFilingofFinalNon -Infringement,Enforceability,and Vaidity
Contentions (LPR 3.2-3.4)

The next events to occur are the responses to the final contentions exchanged at
approximately week thirty-two after service of summons. These responses are due
twenty-eight days (four weeks) after each side's final contentions, i.e., approximately
thirty-six weeks after service of summons. 10 2 Under LPR 3.2, each alleged infringer
must serve its final non-infringement contentions. 10 3 Simultaneously, the party
claiming infringement must serve its final contentions in response to any final
unenforceability and invalidity contentions served by the opposing party. 04 These
105
contentions must be certified by counsel of record.
The Rules require a document production with the Final Invalidity
Contentions. 10 6
This production requires a translation of foreign language
10 7
documents, within limits.
Parties are not locked irrevocably into their final contentions. To amend them,
however, a party must obtain leave of court on a showing of good cause and the
absence of unfair prejudice to opposing parties. 08 Further, any request to amend
must be made promptly upon discovery of the basis for the requested amendment. 10 9
This Rule contemplates that a subsequent claim construction ruling different from
the one proposed by the party may constitute good cause, absent undue prejudice to
the non-moving party." 0
A party's duty to supplement discovery responses does not excuse the need to
obtain leave of court in order to amend its final contentions."'

99 N.D. ILL. LPR 3.1.
100 N.D. ILL. LPR 1.5, 3.1, 4.1; see infra app.
101 See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.6.

N.D. ILL. LPR 3.2; see infra app.
N.D. ILL. LPR 3.2.
104 Id.
102
103

105
106

See N.D. ILL. LPR 1.5.
N.D. ILL. LPR 3.3.

107 Id.
108 N.D.
109 Id.

110 Id.
111

Id.

ILL. LPR 3.4.
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J. Week 36: FinalDate to Seek Stay PendingReexamination (LPR 3.5)
The exchange of the parties' final contentions under LPR 3.4 also forms a cutoff
date to seek a stay pending a request for reexamination of a patent in suit.112 The
view of the Court and the working group was that this would, among other things,
discourage parties from strategically requesting a stay in belated fashion.

IV.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDINGS

The working group that prepared the initial draft of the Rules debated at length
when, during the course of the litigation, claim construction should take place. It
considered the possibility of requiring early determination to facilitate settlement
and focus infringement and invalidity discovery in light of the claim construction
ruling. The consensus, however, favored conducting claim construction later in the
litigation process, after fact discovery is largely complete. The primary rationale is
that the discovery process will enable the parties to identify the critical claim terms
whose disposition will control the litigation.
By way of background, beginning in 2006, the Federal Circuit clarified that its
en banc precedent does not require a trial court to be blind to the accused product or
process in connection with claim construction. 1 3 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
indicated that a trial court should consider the accused instrumentality in
determining what aspects of the asserted patent claims should be construed,
generally citing judicial efficiency as the reason. 114 One panel of the Federal Circuit
in September 2006 seemed critical of the appellate record's failure to identify aspects
of the accused product, taking the view that the Court should not operate in a
vacuum when reviewing claim construction. 115 Proponents of conducting claim
construction later in the litigation process generally argue that knowledge of the
accused product or process sufficient to determine what is dispositive tends to be
unavailable early in discovery, so that early claim construction tends to be premature
116
and unfocused in most cases.
Ultimately, the Northern District adopted a rule that sets the claim construction
process to begin about eight to nine months after the initial disclosures and, as
112N.D.

ILL. LPR 3.5.

Compare SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(en banc) ("A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the prior art,
the prosecution history, and the specification, not in light of the accused device."), with Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("[K]nowledge of [the accused] product or process provides meaningful context for the first step of
the infringement analysis, claim construction." (citations omitted)).
114 Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1309 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1326-27, 1330-31 (court needed "context" of the accused product
when construing claims); Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt. LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
115 Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1350-51
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
116 See N.D. ILL. LPR pmbl.; Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment and
JudicialDiscretion,9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 95-97 (2005).
113
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discussed earlier, to allow fact discovery to reopen for a brief period following the
claim construction ruling.117 The Preamble to the Local Patent Rules describes the
Court's rationale as follows:
The Rules also provide a standardized structure for claim construction
proceedings, requiring the parties to identify and exchange position
statements regarding disputed claim language before presenting disputes to
the Court. The Rules contemplate that claim construction will be done, in
most cases, toward the end of fact discovery. The committee of lawyers and
judges that drafted and proposed the Rules considered placing claim
construction at both earlier and later spots in the standard schedule. The
decision to place claim construction near the end of fact discovery is
premised on the determination that claim construction is more likely to be a
meaningful process that deals with the truly significant disputed claim
terms if the parties have had sufficient time, via the discovery process, to
ascertain what claim terms really matter and why and can identify (as the
Rules require) which are outcome determinative. The Rules' placement of
claim construction near the end of fact discovery does not preclude the
parties from proposing or the Court from requiring an earlier claim
construction in a particular case. This may be appropriate in, for example,
a case in which it is apparent at an early stage that the outcome will turn
on one claim term or a small number of terms that can be identified without
118
a significant amount of fact discovery.
The Rules do not preclude referral of claim construction to a magistrate judge or
master. Part 4 of the Rules addresses claim construction proceedings.

A. Week 38: Only Ten Claim Terms to be Construed (LPR4.1)
Two weeks after service of the final non-infringement contentions of the accused
infringer(s) and coincident service of the final enforceability and validity contentions
by the party asserting infringement, each party must serve a list of the claim terms
and phrases it wants the Court to construe. 119 The list may be lengthy. Along with
these disclosures, a party must describe its proposed constructions of the terms and
provide information about section 112(6) claim elements. 120 This is approximately
121
thirty-eight weeks after service of summons.
One week later, that is, approximately thirty-nine weeks after service of
summons, the parties are required to meet and confer to agree upon no more than
ten terms or phrases to submit for construction by the Court. 122 If the parties cannot
agree on which ten terms to submit, the Rule allocates them evenly: five to "all
ILL. LPR 1.3; see infra app.
ILL. LPR pmbl.
119N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1(a).
117 N.D.

118N.D.
120

Id.

121

See infra app.
ILL. LPR 4.1(b); see infra app.

122 N.D.
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plaintiffs" and five to "all defendants."'123 The parties must certify whether each of
the claim terms presented to the Court is outcome-determinative. 124 The limitation
to ten terms may be expanded upon a showing of good cause. 125 The Rule gives one
example of such good cause-the assertion of multiple, non-related patents "in an
126
appropriate case."'
The limitation to ten claim terms aims at requiring the parties to focus on terms
that are likely to be outcome-determinative. 127 Most judges have experience with
claim construction proceedings in which the parties and the Court spend enormous
time and effort on claim terms that are highly unlikely to be dispositive. The goal is
to avoid such situations.
In many cases, construction by the Court of a limited number of key claim terms
will lead to prompt disposition via settlement or summary judgment. 128 In cases in
which this does not occur, further action may be required prior to trial, such as via
motions in limine, to construe any disputed claim terms that remain. 129 The Rule
includes a comment elaborating on the goals of the ten-term limitation:
In some cases, the parties may dispute the construction of more than
ten terms. But because construction of outcome-determinative or otherwise
significant claim terms may lead to settlement or entry of summary
judgment, in the majority of cases the need to construe other claim terms of
lesser importance may be obviated. The limitation to ten claim terms to be
presented for construction is intended to require the parties to focus upon
130
outcome-determinative or otherwise significant disputes.

B. Weeks 43, 47 & 50: Claim ConstructionBriefs (LPR 4.2)
The Court opted to give the accused infringer(s) the right to submit the opening
and closing claim construction briefs. 131 The Court considered and rejected the
concept of simultaneous briefing, believing that sequential briefing is more likely to
keep both parties focused on truly disputed issues. The Rules offer the following
Comment to LPR 4.2:
The committee opted for consecutive claim construction briefs rather
than simultaneous briefs, concluding that consecutive briefing is more
likely to promote a meaningful exchange regarding the contested points.
123

N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1(b).

124

Id.

125

Id.

126 Id.

N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1 cmt.
See id.; e.g., Terlep v. Brinkman Corp., No. 02-CV-5127, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28453, at
*7-17 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 29, 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendant after construing five
claim terms), affd, 418 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
129 E.g., Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(stating that after the district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, defendant
filed a "Motion in Limine And Request for Markman Hearing').
13o N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1 cmt.
131 N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2(a), (d).
127
128
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For the same reason, the committee opted to have the alleged infringer file
the opening claim construction brief. Patent holders are more likely to
argue for a "plain meaning" construction or for non-construction of disputed
13 2
terms; alleged infringers tend to be less likely to do so.
The opening brief for the party opposing infringement is due five weeks after the
exchange of claim terms, i.e., approximately forty-three weeks after service of
summons. 133 The Court expanded its customary fifteen page limit to a limit of
34
twenty-five pages, absent prior leave of court.
If a party offers testimony of a witness in support of its proposed claim
construction, it must include a sworn declaration by the witness with its initial claim
construction brief. 135
The party must then make the witness available for
36
deposition.
The parties are required to file with the Court a joint appendix containing the
patent(s) in dispute and their prosecution history. 137 Any party may file additional
1 38
materials as a separate appendix to its claim construction brief.
The patent proponent's responsive claim construction brief is due four weeks
later, i.e., at approximately week forty-seven after service of summons. 39 This brief
is likewise limited to twenty-five pages, and the party must provide a sworn
declaration of any witness it offers to support its proposed claim construction and
make that witness available promptly for deposition. 4 0 If this occurs, the accused
141
infringer receives an extra week to file its reply brief.
Absent any witness statement from the patent proponent, the accused
infringer's reply claim construction brief is due fourteen days after service of the
opposing party's brief, i.e., at approximately week forty-nine after service of
summons. 42 The Court opted not to have a fourth brief in the normal case,
explaining as follows in a Comment to LPR 4.2:
The Rules provide for three briefs (opening, response, and reply), not
four, due to the likelihood of a claim construction hearing or argument. The
Court's determination not to hold a hearing or argument may constitute a
basis to permit a surreply brief by the patent holder. A judge may choose
143
not to require a reply brief.

N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2 cmt.
133 N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2(a); see
132

infraapp.
Compare N.D. ILL. LR 7.1 (restricting the page limit of briefs to fifteen pages absent prior
approval of the court), with N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2(a), (c) (restricting the page limit of Claim Construction
Briefs to twenty-five pages absent prior approval of the court).
135 N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2(a).
134

136Id.
137 N.D.
138 Id.
139 N.D.
140 N.D.
141Id.

ILL. LPR 4.2(b).

ILL. LPR 4.2(c); see infraapp.
ILL. LPR 4.2(c).

142

N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2(d); see infra app.

143

N.D. ILL. LPR 4.2 cmt.
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One week after the reply brief is filed, the parties must file a joint claim
construction chart and a joint status report, nominally at approximately week fifty
after service of summons. 144 Its contents are set forth in LPR 4.2(f).145

C. Week 53: Claim ConstructionHearing(LPR4.3)
Under LPR 4.3, oral argument or a hearing may be held, nominally twenty-eight
days after the reply brief, i.e., at approximately week fifty-three after service of
summons. 146 The Rule provides for the judge to enter an order describing the
schedule and procedures. 147 Demonstrative exhibits are to be exchanged at least
148
three days before the hearing.

D. Week 59 (Nominal): Claim ConstructionRuling
The Rules do not impose a deadline for the Court issuance of its claim
construction ruling. Some variation is inevitable in the timing of such rulings after
the claim construction hearing. Because the Rules aim to have a case ready for trial
within two years of service of summons, the effect is to assume a six-week period for
the Court to rule after the claim construction hearing-in other words,
149
approximately fifty-nine weeks after service of summons.

V. POST CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
If a judge exercises his discretion to move the claim construction proceedings to
an earlier time in the case, the remainder of the schedule likely will have to be
adjusted accordingly. Though one would assume that any such adjustments would
encompass the Rules' provisions protecting opinions of counsel from discovery for a
150
reasonable term and holding expert witness discovery until after fact discovery,
the particulars of any such adjustments must be made on a case-by-case basis. The
normally-contemplated schedule for post-claim construction events is discussed
below.

A. Weeks 59-65 (Nominal): AdditionalFactDiscovery (LPR 1.3)
As discussed earlier, because a court's claim interpretation ruling may have a
significant impact on the case, the Rules provide for reopening of fact discovery for a
brief period after the claim construction ruling. Specifically, LPR 1.3 provides for a
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N.D.
N.D.
N.D.
N.D.

148

Id.

149

See infra app.

144
145
146

ILL. LPR
ILL. LPR
ILL. LPR
ILL. LPR

4.2(0; see infra app.
4.2(0.
4.3; see infra app.
4.3.

150 See N.D. ILL. LPR 3.6(a), 5.1(b).
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six-week period of further fact discovery beginning with entry of the claim
construction ruling.151 If the Court has ruled on claim construction six weeks after
the hearing, the resumed period of fact discovery would conclude approximately
152
sixty-five weeks after service of summons.

B. Week 60 (Nominal): Opinions of Counsel (LPR3.6)
When a party relies on an opinion of counsel in defense to an allegation of willful
infringement, a waiver of the attorney-client privilege results. 15 3 The Rules defer,
until after claim construction, any discovery regarding the substance of a claim of
reliance on advice of counsel, 15 4 so that a party who may claim such reliance is not
forced to make the choice to give up the attorney-client privilege until a relatively
late stage of the litigation. Specifically, discovery into this is not permitted until
thirty-five days (five weeks) prior to closing of the reopened period of fact discovery
after the Court's claim construction ruling. 155 The timing of such discovery was
slightly ambiguous in the Rules as initially approved, but the Court made a technical
change that clarified the point around the time the Rules took effect.
Under LPR 3.6(b), on the day advice of counsel information becomes
discoverable, a party claiming reliance on advice of counsel must disclose detailed
information regarding the substance of its claim. 156 This allows the opposing party
five weeks before the completion of the resumed period of fact discovery to complete
157
its inquiry into this issue.

151
152

N.D. ILL. LPR 1.3.
See infra app.

153 In
re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Thus, when
EchoStar chose to rely on the advice of in-house counsel, it waived the attorney-client privilege with
regard to any attorney-client communications relating to the same subject matter, including
communications with counsel other than in-house counsel, which would include communications
with Merchant & Gould." (citing Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C.
2003))). The scope of such a waiver generally does not extend to trial counsel communications:
In sum, we hold, as a general proposition, that asserting the advice of
counsel defense and disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute
waiver of the attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel. We
do not purport to set out an absolute rule. Instead, trial courts remain free to
exercise their discretion in unique circumstances to extend waiver to trial counsel,
such as if a party or counsel engages in chicanery. We believe this view comports
with Supreme Court precedent, which has made clear that rules concerning
privileges are subject to review and revision, when necessary. See [Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1966)] (noting that federal courts are "to 'continue the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges."' (quoting [Trammel v. United

States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)])).
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
154
155

156
157

N.D. ILL. LPR 3.6(a).
Id.
N.D. ILL. LPR 3.6(b).
N.D. ILL. LPR 3.6(a).
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C. Weeks 68, 73 & 78 (Nominal): Expert Witness Discovery (LPR 5.1-5.3)
Mindful that claim construction rulings often have a significant impact on the
issues to be decided in patent infringement cases, the Court opted to defer expert
discovery until after a claim construction ruling. 58 The goal was to avoid the need
for experts to revise their opinions, disclosed prior to claim construction, after a
ruling or to word their opinions in an either-or format. As a result, expert witness
disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) are due "within
twenty-one (21) days after the close of discovery after the claim construction
ruling."15 9 Under LPR 1.3, the close of fact discovery occurs forty-two days (six
weeks) after the claim construction ruling. 160 Assuming the Court issues its claim
construction ruling six weeks after the claim construction hearing, i.e., at
approximately week fifty-nine after service of summons, the resumed period of fact
discovery would close at week sixty-five. 161 Adding three more weeks, expert witness
reports would be due at approximately week sixty-eight. 62 Rebuttal expert reports
are due five weeks later, in other words, at approximately week seventy-three after
service of summons, under the scenario suggested. 163 The parties have five weeks
after the submission of rebuttal reports to complete expert depositions, making that
164
deadline fall at approximately week seventy-eight under this scenario.
LPR 5.3 provides that amendment or supplementation of expert reports after the
deadlines is presumptively prejudicial. 165 The Court may permit amendment or
supplementation only upon a showing of good cause that the amendment or
supplementation "could not reasonably have been made earlier and that the opposing
' 166
party is not unfairly prejudiced."

D. Week 82 (Nominal): DispositiveMotions (LPR 6.1)
The Local Patent Rules set a deadline for filing any dispositive motion four
weeks after the completion of expert discovery, nominally at approximately week
eighty-two after service of summons. 16 7 The comment to this Rule states that the
68
Rules do not preclude a party from filing a dispositive motion earlier in the case.
The Rules leave this up to the assigned judge. 169 If a party files an early summary
judgment motion that raises a claim construction issue, LPR 1.1 allows the judge to
defer consideration of the motion until after claim construction proceedings are
completed.170
N.D. ILL. LPR 5.1(b).
159 Id.
16o N.D. ILL. LPR 1.3.
158

161

See in/ra app.

162 See in/ra app.
163 N.D. ILL. LPR 5.1(c); see infraapp.
164 N.D. ILL. LPR 5.2; see infra app.
165
166

N.D. ILL. LPR 5.3.
Id.

167 N.D. ILL. LPR 6.1; see infra app.
168 N.D. ILL. LPR 6.1 cmt.
169
170

Id.
N.D. ILL. LPR 1.1.
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The Rules do not impose a particular briefing schedule for dispositive motions.
This is left up to the assigned judge to determine in the context of the particular case.

E

Week 102 (Nominal): Case Ready for Trial (LPR6.1)

The Rules do not set a specific date on which a case is to be trial-ready. The goal
of the rules, however, was to enable a case to be trial-ready just under two years after
service of summons. 171 This assumes, as noted earlier, a period of approximately six
weeks for the Court to issue a claim construction ruling after holding a claim
construction hearing. 172 The two-year estimate also assumes a period of twenty
weeks for the parties to brief and the Court to rule on any dispositive motions and for
the parties to submit a final pretrial order, including proposed voir dire questions,
jury instructions, witness lists, and the like. 1 73 If this estimate holds, it would result
in a significant decrease in the amount of time that a typical patent infringement
case is pending in the Northern District.

CONCLUSIONS

The Preamble to the Northern District's Local Patent Rules identifies the Rules'
central goals: to provide a standard structure to permit greater predictability and
planning for litigants and the Court, and to eliminate the need to litigate in each case
procedural issues that recur in most patent infringement cases. 174 Consistent with
these goals, the Rules are aimed at minimizing procedural disputes and requiring the
parties to focus at an early stage on the significant substantive disputes. 175 The
ultimate purpose is to reduce litigation expense and permit speedier resolution of
patent litigation. Time will tell if the Rules accomplish this purpose.

171 See infra app.

172 See supratext accompanying note 149.
173 See infra app.
174 N.D. ILL. LPR pmbl.
175

Id.
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APPENDIX
ESTIMATED PATENT CASE SCHEDULE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Event

Scheduled Time

Service of Summons & Complaint

Total Time
(Nominally)
After Service of
Summons
0

Answer or Other Response to
Complaint

(Per Fed. R. Civ. P.)

7 weeks

Initial Disclosures of Both Parties
(LPR 2.1)

14 days (2 weeks)
after Answer or other
responsive pleading

9 weeks

Fact Discovery - Part 1
(LPR 1.3)
Initial Infringement Contentions
(LPR 2.2)

weeks942
14 days (2 weeks)
after Initial Disclosures

Initial Non-Infringement and
Invalidity Contentions
(LPR 2.3)

14 days (2 weeks)
after Initial Infringement
Contentions

Initial Response To Invalidity
Contentions
(LPR 2.5)
Final Infringement,
Unenforceability, and Invalidity
Contentions
(LPR 3.1)
Final Non-Infringement,
Enforceability, and Validity
Contentions
(LPR 3.2)
Last Date to Seek Stay Based on
Reexamination
(LPR 3.5)
Exchange of Claim Terms Needing
Construction
(LPR 4.1)

14 days (2 weeks)
after Initial Invalidity
Contentions
21 weeks
after Initial Infringement
Contentions

14 days (2 weeks)
after Final Validity
Contentions

38 weeks

Opening Claim Construction Brief
(by alleged infringer(s))
(LPR 4.2(a))

35 days (5 weeks)
after exchange of claims
terms

43 weeks

28 days (4 weeks)
after the prior exchange

13 weeks

15 weeks

32 weeks

36 weeks

36 weeks
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Event

Scheduled Time

Total Time
(Nominally)
After Service of
Summons

Responsive Claim Construction
Brief
(by patent infringement
asserter(s))
(LPR 4.2(c))

28 days (4 weeks)
after Plaintiffs Claim
Construction Brief

47 weeks

Reply Claim Construction Brief
(LPR 4.2(d))

14 days (2 weeks)
after Responsive Claim
Construction Brief(s)

49 weeks

Joint Claim Construction Chart
(LPR 4.20

7 days (i week)
after Reply Claim
Construction Brief

50 weeks

Claim Construction Hearing
(LPR 43)

28 days (4 weeks)
after Reply Claim
Construction Brief
6 weeks (?)

Claim Construction Ruling
(nominal)
Discovery re Opinions of Counsel
(LPR 3.6)

Close of Fact Discovery After
Claim Construction Ruling
(LPR 1.3)

60 weeks

42 days (6 weeks)
after claim construction
ruling

65 weeks

21 days (3 weeks)

Rebuttal Expert Reports
(LPR 5.1)

35 days (5 weeks)
after initial expert
reports

Case Ready for Trial

59 weeks

35 days (5 weeks) before
final close of fact
discovery

Expert Reports of Parties with
Burden of Proof
(LPR 5. 1(b))

Completion of Expert Witness
Depositions
(LPR 5.2)
Final Day for Filing Dispositive
Motions
(LPRons
6.after
(LPR 6. 1)

53 weeks

after close of discovery
after the claim
construction ruling

35 days (5 weeks)
after rebuttal expert
reports
28 days (4 weeks)
close of all discovery
20 weeks
after filing dispositive
motions

68 weeks

73 weeks

78 weeks
8
ek
82 weeks

102 weeks

